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Abstract 
The extensive Yugoslav economic migration and presence of Yugoslav ethnic minorities in 
Western Europe, as well as the interaction of this migration with the Yugoslav crisis of the 
1980s, remain under-researched. This article sets out to offer a modest contribution on this 
neglected topic. It argues that short-distance transnational communities and short-term 
migration were already at the centre of grievances articulated on ethno-nationalist grounds in 
the early 1980s. It links these grievances to the different impact of the two oil shocks and the 
process of European integration on each Yugoslav republic, differences which contributed to 
the crisis of federal unity. 
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2 
Introduction 
Yugoslavia underwent a deep economic crisis in the early 1980s that would develop into a 
systemic crisis in the second half of the decade. Despite this protracted period of difficulties, 
however, the literature investigating the reasons for the collapse of Yugoslavia and the wars 
of the 1990s has largely focused only on the second half of the 1980s. Moreover, it 
emphasised the ethno-nationalist drift more than the political divisions between republics 
over strategies to exit the economic crisis that emerged in the early 1980s. The academic 
debate generally attributes the development of irreconcilable positions in the Yugoslav 
federal assembly to the rise and ultimate success of ethno-nationalist rhetoric among the 
political and cultural elites of the country’s republics from the second half of the 1980s. 
There is a broad consensus in the scholarship, for example, that the rise to power of Slobodan 
Milošević in 1987 was a major turning point in the unmaking of federal relations – a turning 
point that opened the gateway to the Slovenian declaration of independence, which was 
followed by the ten-day war between the Yugoslav federal army and the Slovenian Territorial 
Defence (27 June- 6 July 1991), and the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (1992–
1995) and Kosovo (1999). (Baker, 2015, pp. 35‒39; Ramet, 1999, Chapter 1, 2005, Chapter 
7). Studies that discuss the Yugoslav collapse by looking primarily at actors that, from 
abroad, influenced and interacted with Yugoslav domestic dynamics stress that Western 
powers and institutions were too cautious and late to intervene against the expansionist aims 
of the Serbian and the Croatian leadership towards Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Ramet, 2005, 
Chapter 4; Glaurdić, 2011; Shoup, 2008; Baker, 2015, 66‒77, and Chapter 6).i Scholars have 
also examined the role of diaspora communities in the collapse of Yugoslavia. They have 
shown how the leaders of the Yugoslav republics and their co-ethnic communities abroad 
strengthened transnational ties from the late 1980s. These ties were important for gathering 
financial and media support for ethno-nationalist explanations and solutions to the 
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deteriorating status quo (Skrbiš, 1999; Hockenos, 2003; Ragazzi, 2009; Bock-Luna, 2007; 
Radeljić, 2012, Chapter 4). 
The purpose of this article is to explore in greater depth how domestic and external actors and 
factors interacted in the Yugoslav crisis of the 1980s. It does so by focusing on migration. 
Unlike existing studies, however, this article does not set out to investigate ethno-nationalisms 
in Yugoslavia as they developed in the late stages of the crisis in the second half of the 1980s. 
Instead, it concentrates on the economic crisis of the first half of that decade. Rather than 
examining long-distance nationalism and diaspora support for alternatives to the Yugoslav 
federal and socialist project, the article shows that short-distance transnational communities 
and short-term migration were already at the centre of grievances articulated on ethno-
nationalist grounds in the early 1980s. It endeavours to prove this by showing that the 
consequences of the two oil shocks, in 1973 and 1979 respectively, and the advancement of 
European integration, had two major effects. First, they resulted in changes in the 
international mobility of Yugoslav migrants towards western European countries. Second, 
they changed relations between Yugoslav and hosting countries’ state authorities on the one 
hand and Yugoslavs living in those countries on the other hand. These two changes affected 
the six Yugoslav republics in different ways that, this article will argue, served to exacerbate 
pre-existing socio-economic regional disparities, which were themselves the reason for 
political divisions between the Yugoslav republics. These changes therefore contributed to the 
crisis of federal unity during the 1980s.  
Moreover, this article shows that the crisis of Yugoslav domestic cooperation occurred in 
close connection with broader changes in the European and Cold War equilibriums. The 
article underlines the causative role of international migration in Western Europeii in this 
process. In particular, the article draws attention to the fact that the approach towards 
international migration changed between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s in the western 
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European hosting countries. From accepting international migration as a factor promoting 
economic cooperation and European integration in the aftermath of the first oil shock, the 
approach changed in the aftermath of the second oil shock to implementing a dual system of 
migration. This now linked freedom of movement of labour to EEC membership on the one 
hand, and the creation of new restrictions on non-EEC members on the other. Given the 
inclusion of countries lying on the northern bank of the Mediterranean Sea (Greece, Spain, 
Portugal) in the EEC, the effect was to shut out the south Mediterranean (Turkey and 
Maghreb). 
The article shows that socialist Yugoslavia, which, like other Mediterranean sending 
countries, exported its labour force to Western Europe, was affected by these changes in a 
particular way. The article explains that Yugoslav migration patterns towards Western Europe 
varied by region, reflecting the different relations that each Yugoslav republic maintained 
with Western Europe. The republics’ different relations with Western Europe constituted one 
of the main factors determining their different levels of development and of integration in the 
world economy, both of which were key in shaping the republics’ various responses to the 
Yugoslav economic and political crisis of the 1980s. These differences also meant in turn that 
the changes in the regulation of international migration in Western Europe affected Yugoslav 
migrants and their regions of provenance in different ways. 
To prove its case this article focuses on Slovenia. The rationale for this focus is partly that 
Slovenia’s geographic proximity and historical legacyiii meant it had developed strong ties 
with neighbouring European countries and was involved earlier than other Yugoslav regions 
in labour migration towards Western Europe. As the most developed Yugoslav republic, 
moreover, Slovenia was to be a key actor during the debt crisis of the 1980s. The republic’s 
favourable economic condition was also the reason why workers from other Yugoslav 
republics migrated to Slovenia in search of employment, especially at times when job 
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opportunities became less available in the domestic market or overseas. In addition, Slovenia 
was directly involved in territorial contentions between Yugoslavia and neighbouring Italy 
and Austria, due to the presence of Slovenian ethnic minorities living in the contested areas of 
these countries adjoining the Slovenian border. Accordingly, the argument is not that Slovenia 
was the republic most affected by emigration. It is also not the case that its leadership 
explained emigration of its nationals as a consequence of exploitation by other republics. This 
might have been the case with Croatia and, eventually, Serbia (Zimmerman, 1987, pp. 125, 
126). Nonetheless, this article argues that Slovenian relations with Western Europe and the 
migrations they generated contributed to forging Slovenian ethno-national identity, and the 
republic’s path to independence, even before the aggressive Serbian leadership drive to 
recentralise Yugoslavia in the late 1980s.  
The article shows that, in the early 1980s, migration became a vehicle for the legitimisation of 
narratives according to which the Yugoslav federation was an artificial construct and a threat 
to a distinctly Slovene national character. This article maintains that macro-economic and 
geostrategic changes occurring in the broader European region and the migration regimes 
these changes supported were in part responsible for this shift in Slovenia. More precisely, the 
article examines how the two oil shocks of the 1970s and the process of European integration 
increased return migration to Yugoslavia and thereby also domestic labour immigration to 
Slovenia, as returning workers found more opportunities in that republic than their home 
republics. Anti-immigrant feeling in Slovenia increased substantially in these years, 
facilitating the growth of new notions of Slovene identity as being radically separate from 
Yugoslav identity. Furthermore, the process of European regional integration, through the 
Alp-Adria community, an EEC project including Austrian, Croatian, Italian and Slovene 
regions, also strengthened ideas of Slovene separateness among Slovenes living outside 
Slovenia. The notion of Slovene ‘Europeanness’ also found a hearing in Catholic circles in 
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Austrian and Italian Alp-Adria regions, solidifying new transnational networks that would 
help later campaigns for Western recognition of Slovene secession. 
To support this argument, the article relies on key studies on migration policies and patterns 
in Yugoslavia and Western European countries, as well as studies on Yugoslav international 
relations. It also draws on statistical data and evidence from the Yugoslav press and state 
political archives. Finally, it employs the collection of relevant documents produced by EC 
bodies on Yugoslav-EEC relations and edited by Branislav Radeljić (2017). 
Labour migration, economic cooperation and European integration in the second half of the 
1970s – and changes in the 1980s 
The argument in this article begins by locating Yugoslavia in the overall changes affecting 
Europe in the period from the early 1970s to the early 1980s. The first and second oil shocks 
and the advancement of European integration led to substantial changes in relations between 
the southern and north-west European countries. These changes had a direct effect on the 
regulation of labour immigration from Mediterranean to north-west European countries. Since 
the very beginning of the process of European integration, the gradual introduction of free 
movement of labour had been considered instrumental in promoting economic development 
and peaceful intra-state relations among Western European countries (Comte, 2012, 2018; 
Tapinos, 2000). Italy, the only emigration country among the EEC founding members, was the 
first and principal beneficiary of this approach. Nonetheless, in the years of economic boom 
in Europe from 1945 to 1971, labour migrants from non-EEC countries were also recruited on 
a large scale, through intra-state bilateral agreements that established short-term contracts and 
foresaw the eventual return of these migrant workers to their countries of origin (Hansen, 
2003).  
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The first oil shock put an end to intra-state agreements for the recruitment of foreign labour. 
By 1975, policies to favour return migration were introduced instead. The OECD sponsored 
negotiations between sending and hosting countries, which aimed to create work places in 
emigration areas, creating a network of experts and legal/economic advisors to help hosting 
and sending countries in their investment projects in emigration areas. One of these forms of 
cooperation consisted in the outsourcing of European enterprises where employment would 
thus be offered for returnees and the local labour force (Tapinos, 2000, p. 300). The 
expectation was that this form of economic cooperation would lead to the development of 
emigration areas and gradually eliminate the reasons for emigration. At the same time, the 
social rights of migrant workers residing in Western Europe improved thanks to negotiations 
within the Helsinki Summit held in 1975 (Kubat, 1993, pp. xi–xv; Petković, 1988, pp. 324–
352). Foreign citizens with a valid working permit and several years of legal and 
uninterrupted presence in the hosting country were given the possibility to apply for family 
reunion. School education for first and second generation migrants in the native language of 
their parents was substantially enhanced (Kubat et al., 1979). By recognising the right of 
migrants to keep their ethno-cultural identity, these social policies had a double aim: on the 
one hand, they strove to improve the interaction between migrants’ families and the hosting 
community; on the other hand, they intended to foster migrants’ ties with their home countries 
to facilitate their eventual return to their countries of origin. 
 
In the second half of the 1970s both these integration policies and the support for return 
migration were failing to help south Mediterranean sending countries and their labour forces 
cope with the consequences of the first oil shock, leading to a steady increase of emigration 
from non-EEC sending countries to EEC countries. This was especially the case for migrants 
from Turkey in FR Germany and from the Maghreb in France.iv. The grey economy of former 
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emigration countries was also attracting a large number of the new waves of immigration. 
Italy and eventually Greece and Spain became countries of immigration in the 1980s, as they 
obtained EEC membership (Greece in 1981 and Spain – together with Portugal –in 1986) 
(Fielding, 1993, pp. 50, 51; King, 1993, 2001). In fact, in the early 1980s, many non-EEC 
migrants reached the north Mediterranean borders of the EEC with plans to find a way to 
migrate further to north-western Europe, where their relatives and co-nationals had previously 
found employment and settled. 
 
The introduction of more restrictive entry policies in the 1980s aimed to curb this unwanted 
and uncontrolled inflow of people from countries in the south towards countries in the north 
of the Mediterranean. Yet, these restrictions were not only targeted at the new wave of 
immigration but were endorsed along with measures to support return migration of non-EEC 
nationals whose presence was increasing greatly in the 1970s and 1980s. This was especially 
the case for migrants from the Maghreb in France and migrants from Turkey and Yugoslavia 
in West Germany. These restrictions imposed on the movement of citizens of non-EEC 
countries went hand in hand with a stronger emphasis on the alleged cultural distance which 
existed between ‘European’ and ‘non-European’ countries. A case in point was the question of 
Turkish migrants in Germany and Turkish EEC accession. Turkey was one of the first non-
founding members to join the Council of Europe in 1949. Turkey was also a founding 
member of the OECD and OSCE, which made Turkey a natural candidate for EEC 
membership. Indeed, Turkey obtained the status of an EEC associated member in 1963 and it 
was envisaged that Turkish migrants would be granted the same status as EEC workers by the 
end of 1986 at the latest (Comte, 2015, p. 114). However, negotiations over Turkey’s 
membership of the EEC became complex and stalled (Arikan, 2003). In 1981, the EEC 
accepted West Germany’s request to postpone concluding an agreement with Turkey. 
9 
Highlighting the difficulties faced by the German labour market at that time, the German 
delegation at the EEC, supported by the Greek delegation, blocked the extension of the 
privileged status to Turkish migrants and asked for specific limitations on the right of 
movement of their family members in and to the EEC (Comte, 2015, p. 114, 115). The 
targeting of Turkish migrants had to do not just with economic concerns, and political 
developments, related to the military coup in Turkey. They were motivated by cultural 
considerations too. The German government considered reducing the number of Turkish guest 
workers in Germany by half, offering them up to 10,500 German Marks of the social fund in 
economic aid. This was because these nationals were allegedly, on account of their cultural 
differences, likely to be in tension with German and European values (Chin, 2007, pp. 150–
154).v  
 
While the mobility of Turkish migrants was restricted, the impact of the ‘commuters of 
tomorrow’ (OECD, 1988, as quoted in Mesić & Heršak, 1989, p. 13) was welcomed in 
political debates about the future of European economic migration. This was a reference to 
former labour migrants, who, through their ties both in their countries of residence and origin, 
favoured the transnational exchange of ideas, goods and development (Mesić & Heršak, 1989, 
p. 13). This policy contrasted in important ways with the policies of the 1970s, despite some 
continuities. In the 1970s, support for the transnationalism of migrants and for return 
migration were not mutually exclusive, since both were meant to facilitate economic 
cooperation and further European integration. In the 1980s, by contrast, transnationalism and 
return migration developed into two distinct migration policies which, when applied case by 
case, created rather different relations between EEC’s sending and hosting countries. The 
signing of the first Schengen Agreement in 1985 gradually granted to EEC member state 
nationals the right to freely move between sending and hosting country, thus supporting their 
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transnationalism. The transnationalism of migrant workers from countries that were not yet 
close to being part of the European community became less desirable, so that their plans to 
return to their countries of origin and remain there were strongly supported. This included 
citizens of countries in the south Mediterranean, and Turkey in particular. 
 
Although sources suggest that, unlike Turkish migrants, Yugoslav migrant workers were not 
considered ‘culturally’ problematic by German state authorities and employers, who 
emphasised that Yugoslavs were valuable workers who easily adapted to the Western 
European environment (Molnar, 2014, p. 140, 2016, pp. 198–200; Ivanović, 2012, p. 308), the 
Yugoslav leadership was nevertheless concerned about its citizens residing in Western Europe. 
Like Turkey, Yugoslavia was a ‘third country’ (not a member of the EEC or its affiliated 
regions). Over a million of its citizens resided in Western Europe, a large proportion of whom, 
like migrants from Turkey, were employed in West Germany.vi Moreover, the temporary 
employment of Yugoslav citizens abroad, legalised in Yugoslavia in 1963, continued even 
after the abrogation of recruitment agreements in 1974. Like sending countries on the 
southern bank of the Mediterranean Sea, Yugoslavia was severely affected by the first and 
second oil shocks, and this was one reason why the outflow of workers continued during the 
1970s along with the beginning of a process of settlement overseas of workers who had left in 
the 1960s. These developments in Yugoslav migration patterns led the Yugoslav government 
to participate in international cooperation on return migrationvii and, at the same time, to 
enhance the financing of curricula, cultural and entertainment events for its citizens residing 
abroad.viii 
 
Unlike Turkey and other Mediterranean sending countries, however, Yugoslavia, as a country 
of the Balkan area ruled by a communist leadership, was not in the process of negotiating 
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EEC membership. Yugoslavia was not a country of the Eastern Bloc either and it had an 
independent foreign policy. In fact, in negotiations with the EEC, Yugoslavia defined itself, 
and was defined by EEC institutional bodies, as a “Mediterranean, European and Non-aligned 
country”.ix Because of its peculiar geo-political position, Yugoslavia enjoyed intense 
economic relations with the EEC thanks to its independent position in international relations, 
and in particular its leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Yugoslavia was a 
moderate in NAM and restrained radical pro-Soviet and Chinese influences in the movement, 
which was greatly appreciated in the West (Jakovina, 2011, Chapter 4; Rubinstein, 1970, pp. 
71–72, 328; Zaccaria, 2016, pp. 13, 36, 48, 69). Yugoslavia’s involvement in the NAM was 
also a factor of domestic stability, since it contained conflicts between pro-Soviet and pro-
Western factions within the Yugoslav leadership. In the early 1980s, however, the death of 
Tito, together with the economic crisis and changes in Cold War power relations, challenged 
Yugoslav relations with Western Europe and the ability of its federal system to face a 
stalemate in domestic cooperation. Since, as this section has shown, the regulation of 
international migration was a key aspect of the relation between the EEC and its peripheries; 
and since migration was an important factor for Yugoslavia domestically; changes to the 
migration regime prompted by the two oil crises played an important part in the Yugoslav 
crisis of the 1980s. 
 
The impact of the second oil shock on the Yugoslav crisis. Regional perspectives on 
economic development and emigration towards western Europe 
  
The second oil shock dramatically exposed the dependency of the Yugoslav economy on the 
world market economy and exacerbated political tensions amongst the Yugoslav republics 
over development strategies (Zimmerman, 1987, p. 138; Allcock, 2000, pp. 424‒426; Jović, 
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2009, pp. 155,156). That a dramatic economic turn was coming became evident in 1979 when 
Yugoslavia’s foreign debt reached a record high. Foreign currency reserves dried up as 
countries refused Yugoslavia’s requests for loans due to the escalating crisis in Poland 
(Woodward, 1995b, pp. 252‒254; Martin & D’Andrea Tyson, 1985). A loan of 340 million 
dollars that was finally granted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) came with the 
request for a stronger export orientation and the implementation of economic reforms. The 
federal parliament passed these reforms in 1983 as the Programme for Economic Stabilization 
(Schierup, 1990, pp. 292, 293; Allcock, 2000, pp. 95, 96). However, the federal government’s 
attempt to exercise greater control over the trade revenue and expenditure of the republics – a 
condition demanded by the IMF as a prerequisite for securing any additional loans – did not 
succeed. In 1985, Slovenia’s refusal to pay its federal contribution was followed by the 
abrogation of the Programme for Economic Stabilisation.x One of the main reasons for 
disagreement within the Yugoslav leadership was that the republics advocated divergent 
solutions to overcome the crisis; the less-developed republics (Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina), and Serbia, advocated subsidies to protect the domestic market, while 
the most developed republics, Slovenia and Croatia, pressed for a greater export orientation 
and increased integration in the world market economy (Woodward, 1995a, pp. 63‒74; Calic, 
2011, p. 75).  
 
The relations that each of the Yugoslav republics enjoyed with Western Europe accounted for 
many of the differences in their responses to the crisis of the 1980s, as well as the differences 
in their economic development. Since the 1950s, Western Europe had become Yugoslavia’s 
main economic partner (Obadić, 2014; Zaccaria, 2016). This openness to the Western 
European market came with the introduction of economic reforms that endorsed the 
decentralisation of resources and decision-making at the expense of the federal apparatus – an 
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apparatus that was the main instrument for fostering the equal development of the different 
Yugoslav regions (Horvat, 1976, pp. 60–75). The attainment of equal development, which had 
been a priority in the post-war period, was made a secondary goal in the mid-1960s when the 
introduction of market mechanisms in economic development plans privileged exports over 
the domestic economy and promoted the transition from extensive to intensive system of 
production (Pleština, 1992). Labour emigration towards western Europe had been an 
important aspect of this strategy. By alleviating unemployment and providing remittances, 
employment abroad was meant to help restore the rapid development which had begun to 
falter in 1963. The outcome proved rather different, however, as employment abroad and its 
regulation in fact served to increase the regional disparities it was supposed to alleviate. More 
precisely, because those regions that were geographically closer and better connected to 
Western Europe were also the most developed, economic disparities between the north-
western and south-eastern regions of Yugoslavia deepened. 
 
Yugoslav regional disparities placed the Yugoslav federation and each of its republics in 
different position vis-à-vis the poorest countries in western Europe. For example, in 1987, per 
capita income in Macedonia was 400 dollars while in Slovenia it was 4,500 dollars.xi In 1983, 
the GDP per capita in Yugoslavia was 2,570 dollars, in Portugal 2,190, in Greece 3,970, in 
Ireland 4,810. Macedonia was well behind Portugal, the Yugoslav federation between 
Portugal and Greece, and Slovenia above Greece and close to Ireland.xii This difference in 
Yugoslav economic development by republic was the reason why Yugoslavia was described 
in EEC parliamentary discussions about the future of EEC-Yugoslav relations as “half a 
developed [referring to Slovenia and Croatia] and half a developing country [all the other 
republics]”.xiii This duality of Yugoslav development helps explain why in the same 
discussions it was stressed that cooperation agreements with the EEC should grant better 
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conditions of trade and fairer distribution of products within the EEC market to the well-
developed industries of Croatia and Slovenia in particular.xiv 
 
This increase in regional disparities, and the links between regional disparities and the 
different relations which individual Yugoslav republics established with the EEC, were two 
important reasons why Yugoslavia experienced many difficulties in meeting its development 
plans. Employment abroad played a role in these difficulties because it tended to reproduce 
pre-existing patterns of socio-economic underdevelopment and their inter-independence on a 
larger and transregional or transnational scale. By doing so, employment abroad could also 
help reconfiguring relations between Yugoslav and EEC regions and countries. This is 
proven by the fact that several documents of EEC institutions made clear that the Yugoslav 
workers residing in EEC member states was a relevant factor which would have a prominent 
importance in the future of relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia.xv Emblematically, 
Italy and FR Germany, the main Yugoslav trade partners within the EEC – these two 
countries absorbed 70 percent of total Yugoslav exports to the EEC – contained the largest 
numbers of Slovenes (because of the presence of the Slovene minority in Italy) and Croats 
(because the majority of Gastarbeiter were in FR Germany and, of those, most were of 
Croatian nationality). 
 
Regional disparities and Yugoslav workers’ distribution in Western European countries were 
also related to the pace and stage at which Yugoslav regions became involved in international 
migration. In socialist Yugoslavia, post-war external economic migration towards Western 
Europe began in the second half of the 1950s, when it was an illegal phenomenon mostly 
confined to the north-western Yugoslav border regions (Brunnbauer, 2009, p. 45). In the early 
1960s, workers’ emigration continued to increase and expand in Slovenia and Croatia, despite 
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being prohibited until 1963, when it was legalised as temporary employment abroad (Haberl, 
1978, pp. 62‒69).  In the following years, as Yugoslavia signed numerous agreements with 
the principal recruiting countries in Western Europe and Australia, labour emigration rapidly 
became a widespread practice. According to the population census held in 1971, of a total 
Yugoslav population of 20,505,000, the number of Yugoslav workers employed abroad was 
estimatedxvi as between 700,000 and 900,000, accompanied by about 300,000 family 
membersxvii (Baučić, 1973, p. 204). The different regions of Yugoslavia were unevenly 
affected by labour emigration: of the 671,908 Yugoslavs registered as ‘temporarily employed 
abroad’ in 1971, the majority came from the northern republics of Croatia (33.4 percent) and 
from Bosnia-Herzegovina (20.4 percent). Slovenia, which had been one of the two principal 
emigration areas in the early 1960s (along with Croatia), experienced a decrease in its 
emigration rate during the 1960s, with the rate falling to 4.5 percent of the population by 1971 
(Zimmerman, 1987, pp. 74–105). 
 
While labour emigration towards Western Europe declined in Croatia in the 1970s, it 
increased in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the central and south-eastern areas of the federation 
which had only been slightly affected by this phenomenon in the previous decade. 
(Brunnbauer, 2009, p. 28; Zimmerman, 1987, pp. 100‒102. This shift was particularly visible 
in Serbia (Tanić, 1974, pp. 31, 85, 89). As shown by the comparison of data provided by the 
population censuses held in 1971 and 1981 (Table 1), the number of Yugoslav workers 
employed abroad who were from Croatia decreased substantially, while in Serbia they 
increased in number by 50,000 compared to 1971, and those from Montenegro and Kosovo by 
one-quarter and one-fifth respectively. 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
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The relative shift in labour emigration from the north-western to the central and south-eastern 
Yugoslav regions was driven by the rise in unemployment generated by the economic reforms 
implemented in the second half of the 1960s. Attempting to shift from an extensive to an 
intensive industrialisation, these reforms introduced new taxation and price systems as well as 
other measures with the goal of rationalising the governance of the public sector. While this 
offered some benefits to the most advanced industrial sectors, for large enterprises whose 
economic function was more to absorb unemployment than generate profit, the reforms led to 
drastic cuts in work places (Woodward, 1995b, pp. 191–210; Schierup, 1990, pp. 78, 79). 
These types of enterprises were particularly prevalent in the central and south-eastern 
Yugoslav republics and in regions with a predominantly rural population. In these areas, there 
was widespread recruitment of part of the rural population who, in addition to their work in 
agriculture, commuted to the nearest industrial centres to be employed on a temporary basis as 
the lowest skill level of factory workers (Horvat, 1976, pp. 79–87; Rusinow, 1977, pp. 203–
205; Vuksanović & Tomić, 2011, pp. 178–197). Thus, as emigration moved south-east, and 
included peasants, it also acquired a more rural character than it had had in the 1960s.xviii The 
number of peasant migrants was particularly high in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia proper, while in Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina 
peasants only accounted for between one third and two fifths of the workers employed abroad 
(Tanić, 1974, p. 20).  
The ruralisation of labour emigration was not only related to the impact of Yugoslav 
economic reforms on regional socio-economic structures but was also part of macro-economic 
changes which affected the broader European phenomenon. These changes included the 
process of deindustrialisation and technological innovation pushed through in the 1970s in 
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Western Europe (Schierup, 1990, pp. 1, 2) and the impact of industrialisation on rural areas in 
the Mediterranean regions (Tanić, 1974, pp. 19–21). Deindustrialisation and restrictive entry 
policies in Western Europe favoured the flourishing of seasonal and informal recruitment of 
low-skilled migrants, mainly in the service sector, tourism, and construction. Destination 
countries also changed. This shift was visible even in Yugoslav data, despite the increase in 
irregular recruitment. In the 1960s, the large majority of Yugoslavs had left for FR Germany 
or France to work in the car industry. In the 1970s, though, it was the seasonal sectors of 
Austria and Switzerland which absorbed the majority of Yugoslav migrants.xix 
 
This informal and unqualified migration was the object of specific concern to the federal 
government in the early 1980s, when Yugoslavia was severely affected by economic crisis. In 
particular, in late 1982, shortly before the adoption of the stability pact with the IMF, the 
federal government abrogated the economic privileges of returnees (such as the customs 
discounts and tax-free imports envisaged by reintegration policies), and implemented 
economic measures to discourage Yugoslavs from leaving the country and transferring money 
abroad. The Yugoslav Federal Executive Committee introduced an obligation for Yugoslavs 
leaving the country to leave a 5,000-dinar deposit, envisaging an additional 2,000 dinars for 
any additional travel.xx The interest rate on investments in Yugoslav enterprises was cut, 
while all customs concessions were withdrawn, with the exception of that for definitely 
returning workers (Zimmerman, 1987, pp. 114, 127). 
This illiberal approach towards both emigration and return migration was motivated by the 
difficulties faced by the Yugoslav government in trying to intercept migrants’ remittances, 
which remained outside of institutional control at a time when the debt crisis was increasing 
the need for foreign currency (Woodward, 1995b, p. 254). It also related to the loss of skills 
and expertise which characterised the Yugoslav economic migration to Western Europe since 
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the 1970s. In fact, as migration policies became more restrictive and conditions of work 
worsened over time, those migrants who had left earlier (usually from the most developed 
republics) to be employed in the industry of western European countries had more chances of 
gaining skills and of having a positive impact on local development than migrants who left 
rural areas in less developed republics in the 1970s and 1980s to find employment as 
unskilled seasonal workers abroad. A look at return migration offers clear examples of this 
shift.  
Although there are no comprehensive and accurate data on Yugoslav workers who returned to 
Yugoslavia, sources suggest that return migration increased in the aftermath of the two oil 
shocks – namely in the period 1974‒1976 and then again in the early 1980s. These two peaks 
of return migration differed in several respects. In the earlier period, return migration mostly 
affected Slovenia and Croatia, whose workers had left even before the legalisation of 
employment abroad. These migrant workers were often recruited in expanding industrial 
sectors, mostly in France and West Germany, which offered much better salaries than those 
obtained in Yugoslavia as well as opportunities for gaining skills. These features of 
international labour migration were hailed positively in the domestic and international debate 
on return migration and were reasons for policies addressing returnees as a valuable and 
important force for the economic development of the country (Schierup, 1990, pp. 12–14).xxi 
In fact, although international cooperation on return migration eventually failed, it initially 
generated great enthusiasm and in some cases did succeed, at least at first. This was the case 
of the textile factory Pionirka in the poor Dalmatian hinterland (Winterhagen, 2006), and of 
the factory making hydraulic cylinders Hypos Muta in the Slovenian border area with Austria 
(Vedriš, 1978, pp. 64–68).xxii 
In the early 1980s, it was mostly the peasants from the central and south-eastern rural areas, 
above all Macedonia, Serbia proper and the autonomous province of Kosovo, who made their 
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way back home. Unlike their predecessors, their training abroad had been very poor because 
they were recruited on a short-term and often informal basis for hard physical jobs which 
required no or only minimal qualifications. Moreover, they returned at a time when the 
Yugoslav federal government and the governments of hosting countries had lost interest in 
their return as a vehicle to promote economic cooperation and development. Back in their 
community of origin and left to their own devices, they mostly relied on machinery imported 
from abroad to cultivate their own land and used their savings to build or expand their family 
house (Nejašmić, 1981; Vedriš, 1979, pp. 74, 75; Tanić, 1974, pp. 78‒84).  
The meagre profits they gained from working in the agricultural sector pushed these migrants 
to search for additional forms of income (i.e. employment in the public sector), which the 
local market could not satisfy. Again, migrants left their local communities at a time when 
opportunities for employment were becoming less accessible and less secure in their country 
and in Western Europe. Closer destinations in developed areas of the federation became more 
attractive. This was the case of Slovenia, which, being the most developed Yugoslav republic, 
received an increasing number of workers from other republics. For this reason, although the 
Slovenian economy was better placed than any other within the federation, the oil shock had a 
particular effect on Slovenia. The consequences of the changes occurring in the labour market 
of Western Europe were not limited to the increase in domestic migration. The process of 
European enlargement in the north Mediterranean area also strengthened ties between 
communities of Slovenesxxiii living in Slovenia and nearby countries. The interaction of labour 
immigration to Slovenia and transnational ties among communities of Slovenes contributed to 
the articulation of the Slovenian path to independence by making the increasing economic 
disparities between the Yugoslav republics more socially and politically relevant.  
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Labour immigration and transborder regional cooperation in the awakening of the 
Slovenian European identity. A path towards independence 
 
Although economic migration towards Western Europe assumed greater importance for 
socialist Yugoslavia following its legalisation in 1963, domestic migration continued to 
remain important. Yugoslav domestic migration was mostly regional (often occurring within 
the same municipal area), while intra-republic migration was less common (Rančić, 1990). 
The patterns of regional and intra-republic migration were affected by changes occurring in 
emigration patterns towards Western Europe. In particular, domestic migration intensified 
when Yugoslav emigration was made more difficult or return migration occurred, as happened 
in the aftermath of the first and second oil crises. Moreover, in both crises, south-eastern 
regions, and rural areas in particular, were more dramatically affected by the economic 
downturn, with an increase in domestic migration from south to north and from rural to urban 
areas. As mentioned above, Slovenia and its urban centres were among the leading 
destinations of this migration. 
 
Immigration to Slovenia first became an important phenomenon in the mid-1960s at a time 
when emigration from Slovenia to Western Europe was a widespread phenomenon (Meznarić, 
1986, pp. 60–64). Slovenian emigration to neighbouring Western countries was one of the 
reasons for the increasing vacancies in Slovenian industrial areas, most of which were filled 
by workers from other republics (Meznarić, 1978, pp. 305–306). Slovenian migrant workers 
could easily find employment abroad that was economically more advantageous than a job in 
Slovenia. For workers from other republics, meanwhile, the Slovenian labour market offered 
greater possibilities and economic gains than the jobs they could find in their own republics. 
Slovenian enterprises were unsatisfied with immigrants from the south of Yugoslavia because 
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they were allegedly largely unskilled at a time when the Slovenian labour market was in need 
of skilled workers.xxiv Despite this, immigration from other republics was accepted as a 
correction to the inefficiencies of the Yugoslav domestic market, which also affected the 
Slovenian domestic labour market.xxv In particular, Slovenian enterprises increasingly looked 
abroad for the recruitment of skilled workers,xxvi while the immigrants reaching Slovenia from 
the southern regions of the federation were employed in physically hard and intensive jobs 
which were less attractive to Slovenes.xxvii  
 
Already in the second half of the 1970s, however, Slovenian enterprises were beginning to 
take a more cautious approach towards the recruitment of workers from other republics. In 
particular, sources show that the municipality of Ljubljana began to complain about the social 
disorders caused by migrants from other republics encamped at the train station, and asked 
other republics to take action to limit emigration of workers who left without having a job 
contract in Slovenia.xxviii Despite this, immigration to Slovenia continued to increase in the 
1970s; in the early 1980s some 20–25 percent of the total labour force employed in 
Slovenia’s secondary sector were still citizens of other Yugoslav republics (Woodward, 
1995b, p. 365; Heršak, 1986, p. 248 quoted in Schierup, 1990, p. 276). This was because, 
although all Yugoslav republics were affected by the rise in oil prices and its consequences, 
Slovenia was the only republic with a very low unemployment rate that was declining while 
it was increasing everywhere else in Yugoslavia (Woodward, 1995b, p. 206‒209; Korać, 
1981, pp. 1335, 1336). For this reason Slovenia was not only a destination for workers who 
migrated in the domestic Yugoslav labour market but also for those employed overseas who 
had been dismissed or were recruited for seasonal jobs in nearby Italy, Austria and 
Switzerland.  
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Nonetheless, immigration from other Yugoslav republics to Slovenia fell by about 10 percent 
in the period 1980–1984 (Malačič, 1989, p. 329; Meznarić, 1986, p. 74). One of the reasons 
seemed that, in the early 1980s, the likelihood of intra-republic migration was undermined by 
the rise of ethnic tension in Yugoslav labour relations. This tension emerges clearly in several 
sociological studies. For example, cases of discrimination against Kosovo Albanian workers 
were reported in Serbia (Magnusson 1987, p. 276–277), while in Croatia a sociological 
survey revealed that to the question what change was less acceptable among change of job, 
profession, city or republic, this last was defined as the worst possible one (ibid. p. 277). 
Other sociological studies revealed that ethnic tension had grown over time and varied in 
different Yugoslav regions. They sugggested that lowest ethnic diversity of the population 
was correlated to highest ethnic distance (Allcock, 2000, pp. 192–198). 
This latter was the case of Slovenia. Indeed, other sources suggest that Slovenia was more 
affected by ethnic tensions than other Yugoslav republics. Susan Woodward reports that 
conversations with officials and social scientists in Ljubljana revealed that Slovenian 
authorities discussed the possibility of taking action and sending back Bosnian and ethnic 
Albanian workers.xxix The Slovenian planning bureau would have justified the closing of the 
borders to immigrants from the other Yugoslav republics on account of the threat that 
immigration posed to Slovenia’s national and cultural distinctiveness (Woodward, 1995a, pp. 
63, 64; Woodward, 1995b, p. 365). No ban on immigration was ever issued, however, 
suggesting that further research in the archives may be necessary to corroborate Woodward’s 
argument. Nonetheless, many contemporary sociological studies reported frequent episodes 
of social discrimination against national groups from other Yugoslav republics in Slovenia, 
which, along with the decrease in Yugoslav immigration to Slovenia, and the rise of ethnic 
tension in all Yugoslav republics, makes Woodward’s study entirely plausible (Davidović, 
1986, pp. 343, 344; Jović, 2009, p. 146; Meznarić, 1986; Schierup, 1990, p. 276).  
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Several authors also suggest that the animosity generated by the number of immigrants from 
Yugoslavia’s southern republics in the Slovenian labour market bore many similarities to 
xenophobic attitudes displayed towards migrant workers in Western Europe (Davidović 1986; 
Schierup 1990, p. 276). These similarities between the attitudes of the Slovenian authorities 
towards migrant workers and the attitudes of recruiting countries in Western Europe were 
symptoms of broader changes which, while they involved both Western Europe and 
Yugoslavia, led to rather different outcomes. While change was coupled with policies in 
Western Europe that strengthened the project of European integration, in Yugoslavia the 
opposite occurred.  
Despite these different trajectories, developments in Western Europe still affected 
developments in Yugoslavia. The ferment amongst cultural and intellectual circles about the 
Slovenian nation belonging to Europe provides a clear example of this relation. Discontent in 
the early 1980s with the difficulties of coexistence in a federation that was increasingly 
perceived as an unnatural home for Slovenia was not confined to political authorities and 
socio-economic political bodies lamenting conditions in the labour market. Intellectual circles 
and politically engaged Slovenian youth also gradually became more critical of the central 
government and its representative bodies (Patterson, 2010). Although the anti-centralist 
stance that characterised the cultural ferment in Slovenia in these years was certainly a result 
of the crisis of the Yugoslav system, this stance did not develop in isolation. It was from 
abroad that Slovenia found support and evidence that what distinguished Slovenia from the 
other republics was that, while the latter were characterised by their backward Balkan 
traditions, Slovenia belonged to Europe, with which it shared cultural values and its 
Mitteleuropean roots (Patterson, 2003).  
The appropriation of the concept of Mitteleuropa as a geographic and cultural entity in the 
Slovenian pro-independence debate of the second half of the 1980s was not a Slovenian 
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‘reinvention’, however, but a phenomenon involving the broader central European region 
where intellectuals and writers re-invoked their sense of being part of Mitteleuropa.xxx 
Indeed, the revision of European cultural boundaries was not unrelated to European détente 
and the path it took in the first half of the 1980s. More precisely, the inclusion of Greece, 
Spain and Portugal in the EEC and the closure of the EEC borders towards immigration from 
the Muslim and less developed southern Mediterranean bank was accompanied by the re-
launching of transregional cooperation at its more developed and Catholic central-eastern 
borders intended to overcome ideological barriers between western and eastern Europe. The 
Alps-Adria community was an emblematic example of these forms of collaboration.xxxi 
The Alps-Adriatic working community was a project of transregional cooperation that 
initially included Slovenia and Croatia, three Austrian Länder (Upper Austria, Carinthia, 
Styria) and two Italian regions (Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia). The aim of the community 
was to foster economic and cultural cooperation across the borders of the countries involved, 
creating a free industrial zone and drawing on the multicultural and multi-ethnic composition 
of this area as its strength.xxxii The idea of the Alps-Adriatic macro-region had been 
considered as early as in the 1960s, mostly to help overcome tensions between Italian, 
Austrian and Yugoslav governments over contested areas. These proved difficult to surmount 
at the time, but the idea of regional cooperation received a boost at the Helsinki summit and 
an agreement was signed in 1978 (Bucarelli, 2008, pp. 76‒81; Jurić Pahor, 2012). It was only 
in the 1980s that the community assumed an active role in transregional cooperation, thanks 
also to its further inclusion of the Italian regions of Lombardia and Trentino-Alto Adige, the 
two Austrian Länder of Salzburg and Burgerland, the Hungarian regions of Györ‒Sopron, 
Somogy, Vas and Zala, and the German Land of Bayern. As many scholars have noted, with 
the exception of Bayern, the Alps-Adriatic group gradually resembled a smaller version of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and the idea of central Europe as a cultural and geopolitical unity 
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that the Empire embodied (Bucarelli, 2008, p. 78; Mesić & Heršak, 1989, pp. 18, 19; Devetak, 
1988; Gow & Carmichael, 2010, pp. 195, 196). 
The enlargement of the Alps-Adriatic community in the former Habsburg territories and the 
increasing emotional commitment the Habsburg legacy enjoyed among its members in the 
second half of the 1980s was not the result only of European détente and the direction taken 
by European integration. It was also influenced by the ways changes in the global Cold War 
challenged the bipolar equilibrium in Europe. In the first half of the 1980s the decline of the 
geostrategic importance of Africa in the US-Soviet competition over the Third World were 
factors that directly and indirectly shaped relations between western and eastern Europe 
(Westad, 2005, pp.378–380; Grilli, 1993, Chapter Eight). Certainly they were factors which 
challenged the relations between Yugoslavia and Western Europe, as these relations were 
strongly connected to the Yugoslav role in the global Cold War and in particular its position 
in the NAM (Jakovina, 2011, pp. 251, 303, 304). In the 1980s, the NAM was afflicted by its 
inability to overcome internal divisions, which dramatically affected its bargaining power 
with the Blocs (Prashad, 2007, pp. 276‒281). For Yugoslavia, which was facing both its own 
domestic crisis and the crisis in the NAM without the leadership of Tito, cooperation with 
Western Europe assumed a different character. This was probably one of the reasons why, as 
Klabjan shows, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly welcomed the Alps-Adriatic agreement, even 
though it involved only the republics of Croatia and Slovenia (Klabjan, 2013). Resembling a 
form of cooperation that could help overcome east-west divisions, the Alps-Adriatic 
agreement converged with the vision of Yugoslav internationalism based on diplomatic 
relations independent of the superpower blocs and close economic relations with Western 
Europe.  
Nevertheless, it was among the communities of Slovenes inhabiting the Italian and Austrian 
parts of the Alps-Adria community that the more radical positions on Slovenia’s right to 
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independence were formulated on the basis of ethnic claims, even before the debate on 
Mitteleuropa gained ground. In 1985, a Vienna-based Slovenian newspaper published an 
article by the economist Jožko Šavli in which the author expounded the so-called 
Venetological theory which, as Zlatko Skrbiš (2007, p. 138) explains “sought to rewrite the 
history of the Slovenian nation by arguing that Slovenians are indigenous to the European 
continent and thus unrelated to any surrounding ethnic groups”. Maintaining that “Slovenians 
are descendants of the proto-Slavic Venets living around 1200 BC” Slovenian Venetological 
theory further asserted that ‘the Slovenians are an autochthonous European population and 
this quintessential Europeanness makes them the first builders of the European community” 
(ibid, p. 143). 
 
As Skrbiš explains, the Venetological theory was not afforded credence in academic circles in 
Slovenia or abroad. Moreover, the Venetological theory and its supporters were only a minor 
and not the most influential part of the Slovenian diaspora. Support for its genealogical claims 
remained confined to conservative diaspora circles. Its radicalism and sectarianism 
notwithstanding, the Venetological theory was the product of a cultural background 
(Catholicism and anti-Communism) that provided the foundation for alliances between 
Slovenian and European Democratic Christian parties that backed and lobbied for the 
recognition of Slovenian independence and eventual EEC membership (Radeljić, 2012, pp. 
111–119). 
 
 
Conclusion 
Several studies undertaken in the last two decades have shown how long-distance diaspora 
communities became involved in the Yugoslav collapse, providing media and financial 
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support to their co-ethnic leaderships during the wars and eventually in the rebuilding of 
independent national states. However, the extensive Yugoslav economic migration and the 
presence of Yugoslav ethnic minorities in Western Europe, as well as the interaction of this 
migration with the Yugoslav crisis of the early 1980s, remain under-researched. This article 
has set out to offer a modest contribution on this neglected topic. It has done so by illustrating 
how the two oil shocks and the process of European integration affected Yugoslav migration 
patterns differently, and has explored how these differences were a cause of increasing 
political division in the crisis of the 1980s because they reflected the different relations which 
Yugoslav republics enjoyed with Western Europe as well as regional economic disparities. To 
prove its case this article has focused on the case of Slovenia, whose geographic proximity 
and historical legacy meant it was affected in a peculiar way by changes in migration policies 
in Western Europe.  
More precisely, this article has shown that, in the second half of the 1970s, Slovenia, already a 
destination of domestic intra-republic migration on account of its being the most developed 
Yugoslav republic, also became a destination for those Yugoslav migrant workers whose 
international mobility was now restricted by the limitations imposed on the international 
labour mobility of non-EEC citizens in Western Europe in the aftermath of the first and 
eventually second oil shock. The article has explained how reactions by the Slovenian 
authorities and strata of the Slovenian society to the increase in labour immigration first, and 
the ethnic composition of this immigration eventually, bore similarities to the displaying of 
xenophobic attitudes in western European recruiting countries toward migrants from the south 
Mediterranean area. This article has contended that these similarities reflect the fact that 
Slovenian resentment of domestic immigration was motivated not only by the domestic crisis 
but also by new developments in the broader European region.  
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Furthermore, the article has illustrated how within the communities of Slovenian minorities 
living in nearby Italy and Austria, a new theory about the European ethnic origin of Slovenes 
and their belonging to the community of European nations was being elaborated already in the 
first half of the 1980s. This was before the European character of the Slovenian nation 
became widely promoted in the Slovenian pro-independence public discourse in the second 
half of the 1980s. The earlier development among the Slovenian European diaspora of some 
of the core ideas which eventually led Slovenia towards independence was driven by the fact 
that the Alps-Adriatic region they inhabited was part of a project of transregional cooperation 
aimed at bridging ideological divisions in Europe through the links established by ethnic 
minorities across state borders. Since the Alp-Adria cooperation, as well as the new migration 
policies of western European countries, were both symptoms of changes in the Cold War 
equilibrium that had granted Yugoslavia domestic stability and privileged relations with 
Western Europe, analysis of these phenomena placed the crisis of Yugoslav federalism and 
Slovenia’s path to independence in a broader European and Cold War story.  
Accordingly, while the role of long-term migration and long-distance diasporas has been 
noted in the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the nation-building processes that followed, this 
article has shown that short-term migration and short-distance diaspora communities played a 
key role in the particular pace and nature of the Yugoslav crisis, which was interrelated to 
historical legacy, changes in the Cold War equilibrium and the new phase in the process of 
European integration in Western Europe, and the impact which all of these factors had on 
Yugoslav domestic relations.  
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i Indeed, there are also scholars who attribute a different role to Western powers during the 
crisis of the 1980s. For example, Woodward (1995a, 1995b) and Samary (1995) stressed the 
role of Western powers in bringing the Yugoslav federation into a stalemate, mainly by 
imposing economic reforms which increased disparities and division between the most 
developed and less developed Yugoslav republics. 
ii Western Europe is here used as a broad and elastic geographic and geo-political definition, 
since the article analyses Yugoslav diplomatic relations with specific western European 
countries, the European Economic Community (EEC), and EEC member states. 
     iii Before 1918, Slovenia, as well as Croatia and Vojvodina, belonged to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire from which they inherited institutional and informal channels of economic 
migration towards Central and Western Europe. See, for example, Schierup (1990, pp. 
28‒30).  
iv For data on migrants from Turkey in West Germany, see Abadan-Unat (1993). For migrants 
from the Maghreb in France, see Comte (2014) and De Tapia (2008, p. 49). 
v Recent declassified records of a private meeting in October 1982 between the German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, confirms that the 
German Chancellor considered this plan. Record of a conversation between the prime 
minister and the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany at 1930 hours on 28 October 
in Bonn, 28 October 1982, Collection PREM (Prime Minister’s Office Files), fasc. 19, doc. 
1036, The National Archives of the UK, London, p. 1‒3. 
vi In 1984 there were about 612,000 Yugoslavs residing in West Germany. For an overview 
of the problems they faced in the German labour market of the early 1980s, see (Pusić, 1985). 
vii Savezni Komitet za Rad i Zapošljavanje (Federal Committee for Employment), Belgrade 
22.07.1974, Mišljenje o predlogu SR Nemačke da se razmotri mogućnost zaključivanje 
posebnog sporazuma o stručnom obravozanju jugoslovenskih radnika zaposlenih u SR 
Nemačkoj koji nameravaju da se vrate u Jugoslaviju [Opinion on the proposal of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to consider the possibility of concluding a special agreement on the 
professional detachment of Yugoslav workers employed in the Federal Republic of Germany 
who intend to return to Yugoslavia], box 577, folder 6c, Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade. 
viii Centralni komitet saveza komunista Srbije (Central Committee of the League of 
Communists of Serbia), Belgrade 04.1976, Zaključci o informativo‒propagandnoj delatnosti 
među našim radnicima na privremenom radu u inostranstvu [Conclusions on informative-
propaganda activity among our workers on temporary work abroad], box 142-II, folder 705. 
See also Baković (2012) and Ivanović (2012, pp. 143–220). 
ix Radeljić (2017b, p. 38); The interim report by Mr De Clercq Brussels, 13 November 1978, 
State of Commercial and Economic Relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia, European 
Parliament, 407/78. In Radeljić, 2017a, p. 158; The debate on the report drawn up by Mr 
Radoux on behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relations Brussels, European 
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Parliament, sitting of 22 May 1980, EEC-Yugoslavia Cooperation Agreement, (Doc. I-
165/80), in: Radeljić (2017a, p. 205); Statement by Budimir Lončar, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Yugoslavia, Brussels 19 December 1988, Seventh Meeting of the EEC-Yugoslavia  
Cooperation Council at Ministerial Level, (in the European Commission, CEE-YU 1019/88) 
(Annex II/A). In Radeljić 2017a, p. 447. 
x  The Stability Pact was reintroduced in 1988 (Woodward 1995b, pp. 256, 363‒365). 
xi EEC-Yugoslavia Debates of European Parliament, 15 December 1987, No.2-358/89. In 
Radeljić, 2017a, p. 389. 
xii European Commission (RELEX III/1987), Brussels, 27 March 1987, Relations with 
Yugoslavia, The EEC-Yugoslavia Cooperation Agreement, Annex to Annex IV – 
Yugoslavia: Basic Data. In Radeljić, 2017a, p. 378. 
xiii Oral question (O-68/77) with debate, by Mr Bettiza, Mr Cifarelli, Mr Damseaux, Mr De 
Clercq, Mr Geurtsen, Mr Zywietz and Mr Bangemann to the Commission of the European 
Communities Brussels, 14 November 1977, Economic Relations between the EEC and 
Yugoslavia in the Light of the Future Cooperation Agreement, European Parliament, 370/77. 
In Radeljić, 2017a, p. 113. 
xiv Ibid, pp. 114–115. 
xv Ibid, p. 113; See also EEC-Yugoslavia Economic Relations Debates of the European 
Parliament, 19 January 1988, No.2-360/106. In Radeljić, 2017a, p. 418. In order to 
strengthening the relations between Yugoslavia and the Council of Europe in the field of 
migration, Yugoslavia was invited, in 1988, to attend the meetings of the European 
Committee on Migration as observer. Yugoslav Labour and Employment in the Community 
Summary record of the meeting of the Working Group of the Member States and Yugoslavia 
Brussels, 9 September 1988 [listed under 18 November 1988], Council, CEE-YU 1008, 
Annex II. In Radeljić, 2017a, p. 443. 
xvi The registration of labour migrants, both leaving and returning, presented several problems 
which were related, among others, to informal recruitment and different classifications used 
by Yugoslav and foreign countries’ institutions to count and classify data. The reliability of 
estimates decreased after the first oil shock when the abrogation of intra-state bilateral 
recruitment agreements brought about a proliferation of irregular channels and practices of 
recruitment. 
xvii In the population census held in 1971, migrants’ family members were counted together 
with families of diplomatic and other representative institutions. In the population census of 
held in 1981, however, migrants’ family members were treated as a separated category. 
xviii While in 1961 peasants made up only a quarter of the total number of migrants employed 
abroad, in 1976 they comprised over half of all Yugoslavs employed abroad (Veselinov, 
1987, p. 115). 
xix For example, in 1978 registered Yugoslavs leaving for employment abroad recruited in 
Austria were 27.5 percent and in Switzerland 14.1 percent (and increasing) of the total 
recruited, while France and Germany accounted for the recruitment of only 6.8 and 4.8 
percent of the total recruited respectively. (SOPEMI 1981, p. 11).  
xx The obligation, which was very unpopular, was lifted soon after.  
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xxi Savezni komitet za rad i zapošljavanje (Federal Committee for Employment), 02.1976, 
Belgrade, Program mera i akcija za postepeno vraćanje jugoslovenskih radnika sa rada iz 
inostranstva i njihovo radno angažovanje u zemlji [Program of measures and actions for the 
gradual return of Yugoslav workers from work abroad and their work engagement in the 
country], box 142-II, folder 748, Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade. 
xxii Of these, however, only the latter was very successful and still exists today, while the 
former was never able to be competitive for export and eventually went bankrupt in the 
1980s.  
xxiii Communities of Slovenes is here used to define the ethnic communities of Slovenes 
which neither coincided with the territorial republic of Slovenia nor encompassed all 
Slovenian citizens but rather included the people who, irrespective of their citizenship or 
place of living, perceived themselves as Slovenes. 
xxiv Silva Meznarić illustrates that the widespread assumption that immigrants from other 
Yugoslav republics were unskilled and poorly educated does not reflect the reality as data 
suggest that the numbers of unskilled but also of the highly educated immigrants from other 
republics was higher than the Slovenian average (Meznarić, 1986, pp. 73–74). 
xxv Savezna Konferencija SSRNJ (Federal Conference of the Socialist Alliances of the 
working people of Yugoslavia), Ljubljana 10.1972, Stenografske beleške sa međurepubličkog 
savetovanja po pitanjima naših radnika zaposlenih u inostranstvu [Stenographic notes from 
inter-republican consultations on the issues of our employees working abroad], n. 2369/1, 
box 142-II, folder 749, p. 1/44. 
xxvi Coverage of these campaigns was extensive in the press. See, for example: D. O. (1970, 
October 10). Po svoje stručnjake u SR Nemačku [In search of our own experts in Germany]. 
Borba; Krešimir Fijačko K. (1970 October 16). Bolja zarada, pa neće u svijet [Better wages, 
and they will not go overseas]. Vjesnik; Rupnik A. (1971, October 8). Izuci se ‒ Plačamo ti! 
[Get out–We will pay you!] Delo. 
xxvii Savezna Konferencija SSRNJ (Federal Conference of the Socialist Alliances of the 
working people of Yugoslavia), Ljubljana 10.1972, Stenografske beleške sa međurepubličkog 
savetovanja po pitanjima naših radnika zaposlenih u inostranstvu [Stenographic notes from 
inter-republican consultations on the issues of our employees working abroad], n. 2369/1, 
box 142-II, folder 749, p. 3. See also Korać, 1981, pp. 1329–1346; Meznarić, 1986, pp. 76–
77. 
xxviii Samoupravna skupnost za zapošljavanje Ljubljana (Self-managing community for 
employment Ljubljana), 1.4.1976, Obaveštenje [Notice] n. 20/9‒76, box 467, folder. 
297.0231, n. 20/9‒76, Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade. 
xxix In the second half of the 1970s, immigration from Bosnia-Herzegovina increased 
exponentially (46 percent of the total). (Meznarić, 1986, p. 72). 
xxx Among others, Milan Kundera, Gyorgy Konrad, and Czeslaw Miłosz. 
xxxi Jurić Pahor (2012) offers a critical view on the imaginary of the Alps-Adria region as a 
historical unity with a common past. She stresses the selective (re)construction of the Alps-
Adriatic cultural space for the needs and experiences of the contemporary Europe. 
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xxxi Economic Relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia in the Light of the Future 
Cooperation Agreement Oral question (O-68/77) with debate, by Mr Bettiza, Mr Cifarelli, Mr 
Damseaux, Mr De Clercq, Mr Geurtsen, Mr Zywietz and Mr Bangemann to the Commission 
of the European Communities Brussels, 14 November 1977 (European Parliament, 370/77). 
In Radeljić, 2017a, p. 116. 
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Table 1 
Workers temporarily employed abroad and family members who resided abroad with them 
 
 1971 1981 
     
 WORKERS 
TEMPORARILY 
EMPLOYED ABROAD 
FAMILY MEMBERS 
ABROAD 
WORKERS 
TEMPORARILY 
EMPLOYED ABROAD 
FAMILY MEMBERS 
ABROAD 
SFRJ 671,908 91,818 625,069 249,899 
BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA 
137,351 9,468 133,902 49,038 
MONTENEGRO 7,829 3,228 9,781 9,036 
CROATIA 224,722 30,134 151,619 58,711 
MACEDONIA 54,433 13,655 57,966 42,960 
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SLOVENIA 48,086 5,438 41,826 11,657 
SERBIA (ALL) 199,487 29,895 229,975 78,471 
SERBIA PROPER 114,581 18,809 152,932 50,489 
KOSOVO 24,361 1,139 28,965 10,469 
VOJVODINA 60,545 9,948 48,078 17,513 
 
Source: Statistički godišnjak Jugoslavije (1983, 441). 
 
 
